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A ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT OVERVIEW
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS BY MERCHANT-SELLERS IN WHICH CASH AND
PRIZES ARE PAID TO BUYERS' AGENTS: TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD
THEY BE PERMITTED UNDER SECTION 2(c) OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT?
by
William E. Greenspan*
Imagine a situation whereby American Appliance Company
is a large retail dealer selling most major brands of
appliances, including washers, dryers, ranges, microwaves,
dishwashers,
refrigerators
and
freezers.
National
Corporation
an appliance manufacturer, sells appliances to
American.
'on one occasion National offers an "incentive"
program to American's salespeople. Under the terms of the
program, an American salesperson will receive twenty dollars
for each National appliance the salesperson sells during the
month of January.
Payments are mailed by National to the
salespersons at their home address. Naturally, any customer
entering American's spectacular showroom during
looking for an appliance, will be greeted by an Amer2can
salesperson
who eagerly points out . the advantages of
National appliances over other major brands. Some of these
customers, relying on the
salesperson's recommendation,
will buy a National appliance never knowing the salesperson
was partially motivated by the incentive plan.
Many neutral observers, looking at this incentive plan,
may think it is unethical, while others may approve of it as
a widely acceptable way of doing business. Some may
such incentive plans should be illegal. This paper exam2nes
to what extent it is wise and feasible to regulate such
incentive plans under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act: Payment
acceptance of commission, brokerage or other
compensation.
More
specifically this paper will discuss (1) a
Robinson-Patman Act overview, 2 (2) F.T.C. v. Henry Broch &
the
only United States Supreme Court case
rev2ew2ng
section
2(c),
(3)
recent
lower
court
interpretations of section 2(c), (4) Metrix v. Daimler-Benz
Aktiengesellschaft,4
a " case in point" on incentive
programs similar to the American Appliance example stated
above, and (5) conclusions and recommendations.
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In 1936 Congress amended section 2 of the Clayton Act
and enacted the Robinson-Patman Act5 which deals with
illegal price discrimination.
Sections 2(a) and 2(b) are
the heart of the Act, addressing the primary purpose for
which it was passed:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it
to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a
competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because
of _the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability. The
Rob2nson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer
of such advantages except to the extent that a lower
price could be justified by reason of a seller's
diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery
or sale, or by reason of the seller's good faith effort
to meet a competitor's equally low price.6
Section
2(a) prohibits a discrimination in price
between
purchasers of commodities of like grade
and qual2ty, where the effect of such discrimination may be
competition. However a seller may
grant a pr2ce d2fferent2al which reflects reduced costs due
to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale.7
.Bection 2(b) provides another defense to section 2(a)
the "meeting not beating" defense. In order to prevail on
section 2(b) "meeting not beating" defense, an accused
seller must show that he lowered his price in good faith to
meet, but not beat, that of a competitor of the
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are companion sections. A
seller is prohibited from making cash payments [2(d)] to a
for promoting the
product, or furnishing
serv2ces
or
[2(e)J (advertising, catalogs,
demonstrators, d2splay materials, special packaging) to a
customer for promoting the seller's product unless such
payments, services or facilities are made available to all
competing customers on proportionally equal terms.9
The difference between the two subsections is that in
subsection (d) the customer supplies the services or
facilities and his vendor pays the bill
and in
subsection (e) the wholesale vendor himself supplies
the services and facilities for the use of his customer
in facilitating resales.lO
Section 2(f) is the "flip side" of section 2(a). It
a buyer from knowingly inducing or receiving a
d2scrimination in price prohibited by section 2(a).ll Even
though the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to prevent
large buyers from using their economic advantage to secure a
discrimination in price, section 2(a) makes no mention of
any restraint on buyers. Instead it only prevents sellers
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from engaging in price discrimination. Therefore, although
a buyer could not be held liable under section.2(a) for
price discrimination, such
could b7 held
for
violating section 2(f) fQr hav1ng know1ngly 1nduced a
violation of section 2(a).l 2
Section 2(c), with which this paper is concerned,
prohibits a party from paying or receiving a
brokerage
or discount in lieu thereof, except fol serv1ces
rendered 'to or from the other party or his agent. 3 Stated
section 2(c) prohibits a seller from paying a
to a buyer or his agent in connection with the
sale of goods, unless actual services are p7rformed
connection with the sale. Likewise a buyer or h1s agent 1s
prohibited from receiving a commission from the
in
connection with the sale of goods, unless actual serv1ces
are performed in connection with the sale. Section 2(c) is
a "per se" violation. None of the enumerated defenses in
sections 2(a) and 2(b) (no lessening of competition, cost
justification, "meeting not beating") are available when one
is charged with a violation of section 2(c). The only
possible defense, the "for services rendered" proviso, has
been narrowly interpreted and rarely allowed as a defense.
Early interpretations of the "for services rendered" defense
indicate that it was only included to make sure that a
"bona-fide
independent"
broker
would
not be denied
compensation:
The agent cannot serve two masters, simultaneously
rendering services in an arm's length transaction to
both. While the phrase, "for services rendered," does
not prohibit payment by the seller to his broker for
bona fide brokerage services, it requires that such
service be rendered by the broker to the person who has
engaged him.
In short, a
selling function
cannot be combined in one person.
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
legislative history of section 2(c) in F.T.C. v. Henry
Broch & Com)any,l? and gave examples of the type of conduct
section 2(c
was intended to prohibit. This was the first
and only section 2(c) case to reach the Court.
F.T.C. v. HENRY BROCH & COMPANY
Broch
was a broker
or sales representative for
approximately 25 sellers of food products, including Canada
Foods, a processor of apple concentrate and other products.
Canada Foods set its price for apple concentrate at $1.30
per gallon in 50-gallon steel drums, including a five per
cent commission for Broch. J.M. Smucker Co., a large buyer
of apple concentrate for use in its manufacture of apple
butter and preserves, offered to purchase 500 steel drums of
apple
concentrate
at
$1.25 per gallon.
Aft7r some
negotiations, a sale was arranged at $1.25, w1th the

condition that Broch reduce its commission from five per
cent to three per cent to absorb half of the price
reduction.
The reduced price of $1.25 was granted to
Smucker on subsequent sales, while sales to all other
customers continued to be $1.30 with Broch earning his usual
five per cent commission.l6
The

Federal Trade Commission found the price reduction
to Smucker was a disQount in lieu of of brokerage in
Vlolatlon of section 2(c).lf The Seventh Circuit reversed
holding _that "[n]either the language of § 2(c) nor
legislat1ve history indicates that a seller's broker is
covered by§ 2(c)."l 8
. The

United

States Supreme Court granted certiorari t
2(c) is applicable to this
Rev1ew1ng the leg1slative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act, the Court stated:
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and
prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
preferences over smaller ones by virtue
th71r greater purchasing power . . . . Congress in
1ts Wlsdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only to cover
the
methods then in existence but all other means
by Whlch brokerage could be used to effect price
discrimination.20
The Court further noted which parties may be
as "any person" in section 2(c):
The particular evil at which § 2(c) is aimed can be as
easily perpetrated by a seller's broker as by the
seller himself .
The seller's broker is clearly
"any person" as the words are used in § 2(c) - as
clearly such as a buyer's broker.21
Thus the Court supported the position of the Federal
Trade Commission:
We
conclude that the statute clearly applies to
payments or allowances by a seller's broker to the
buyer,
whether
made
directly to the buyer, or
indirectly,
through
the
seller.
The allowances
proscribed by § 2(c) are those made by "any person"
which, 2 a2 s we have said, clearly encompasses a seller's
broker.
Although

there are numerous ways one may abuse the
function to effect a price discrimination in
violat1on .of
2(c), one instructive aspect of Broch
1t ident1f1es three situations which are clearly
v1olat1ons of section 2(c). The first situation describes
setting up "dummy" brokers:
One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect
price concession was by setting up "dummy" brokers who
were employed by the buyer and who, in many cases,
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rendered no services. The large buyers demanded that
the seller pay "brokerage" to these fictitious
who then turned it over to their employer. Thls
practice was one of the chief targets of § 2(c) of the
Act.23
In a second situation, a large buyer seeks to evade
section 2(c) by accepting price reductions equivalent to the
seller's normal brokerage payments. The buyer negotiates
directly with the seller, instead of through.the
broker. The buyer insists on and receives a pr2ce reductlon
from the seller equal to the amount of the brokerage or
commission the seller would have normally paid to the
broker.
This is "an allowance in lieu of brokerage under
§ 2(c) and [is] prohibited even though, in fact, the seller
had 'saved' his
expense by dealing directly with
the selected buyer."
The third situation is Brach. A large buyer (Smucker)
asks for a price reduction from the seller (Canada Foods).
The seller normally sells through a broker (Brach). The
seller
telephones the broker and advises the broker that
the seller will make the sale at the reduced price if the
broker agrees to yield part of his brokerage fee for sales
with that buyer only. The broker agrees, and the sale takes
place. This violates section 2(c).
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent
sellers and sellers' brokers from yielding to the
economic pressures of a large buying organization by
granting unfair preferences in connection with the sale
of the goods. The form in which the buyer pressure is
exerted is immaterial . . . . There is no difference in
economic effect between the seller's broker splitting
his
brokerage commission with the buyer and his
yielding part of the brokerage to the seller to ge
passed on to the buyer in the form of a lower price. 2
In summary, the Court made it clear that section 2(c)
is a "per se" statute, absolute in its terms. None of the
defenses in section 2(a) (no lessening of competition, cost
justification, "meeting not beating") are available when one
is charged with a section 2(c) violation. In
the
"services rendered" exception appeared to be llmlted to
situations involving payments by a seller or buyer to his
own broker, and that neither party to a transaction nor his
broker could perform legitimate services for the other
party.
However, in dictum, the Court made one troubling
statement:
There is no evidence [in this case] that [Smucker]
rendered any services to [Canada Foods] nor that
anything in [Smucker's] method of dealing justified its
getting a discriminatory price by means of a reduced

I
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brokerage charge. We would h.av.e.qu.ite a different case
if there were such evidence
26

I

I
I
I

Does
this
mean
there
might be some situation
whereby the "services rendered" exception would be used to
allow a limited cost justification defense when the seller
shows
a
savings in distribution costs because of a
method of dealing? Would it make any
lf allowances in brokerage were · made on a
basis?
Brach
left these questions
unanswered, rlsklng inconsistent applications of Brach in
future court decisions.
----RECENT LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 2(c) ISSUES
Predictably, recent court opinions dealing with section
discussed whether Brach dictum "opened the door"
defenses when one is charged with a section 2(c)
Vlolatlon. The results have been inconsistent.
2(c)

In Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc. v. Amata,27 Federal sold
wood and paper products, including recycled paperboard and
paperboard cartons made from wastepaper. Federal routinely
bought wastepaper from several wastepaper suppliers. Amata,
who worked for Federal, was responsible for purchasing
wastepaper from these competing suppliers at the most
advantageous price and delivery terms. Amata demanded and
accepted bribes and kickbacks from these suppliers with the
result that the majority of Federal's wastepaper came from
suppliers making payments to Amata. The cost of the bribes
passed on to Federal in the sales price. When Federal
dlscovered Amata's conduct, Federal fired Amata. Federal
was then able to purchase wastepaper from several suppliers
at lower prices.2 8
Federal sued Amata and the bribe-paying suppliers
claiming, among other things, a violation of section 2(c) of
the
Act.
alleged "that the payments
recelved by Amata were not for bona fide services rendered
but were commercial bribes." 2 9 In defense, the
Federal
to allege anticompetitive injury,
Whlch ls a prerequ2s2te for a section 2(c) violation.30
The court held that the facts of this case were covered
by section 2(c), and that anticompetitive injury is not a
prerequisite for a section 2(c) violation.
Payments were made to Amata, an agent of the buyer
that were not for services rendered. To
to make additional allegations of
antlcompetitlve effect in order to establish a prima
facie violation of section 2(c) would be to impose a
common law limitation on the broad language enacted by
Congress.
At least a few courts appear to have held
that in order for payments to constitute a violation of
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section 2(c) the payments must have an anticompetitive
effect
This court finds, however, that
long-standing Second Circuit precedent and Supreme
Court dicta refute any claim that anticompetitive
injury is an element of a violation of section 2(c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.31
In Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum,32
Congoleum
Corporation, a felt manufacturer, sold products to Seaboard
and others who engaged in the wholesale distribution of
roofing felt.
Jack Berk, a sales manager for Congoleum,
recommended to Congoleum that Manufacturers Reps Company
(MRC) become a commissioned sales agent for Congoleum.
Congoleum agreed. Unknown to Congoleum, Berk and MRC had a
secret arrangement whereby MRC paid bribes (consulting
services) to Berk.
Since Berk had the ability to cause
orders to be cancelled or delayed and could steer customers
to another distributor or agent, Seaboard lost
customers who transferred their business to MRC. When
Congoleum's management found out about Berk's conduct, it
discharged Berk.
Meanwhile, Seaboard sued Congoleum, Berk
and MRC alleging, among other things, a violation of section
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.33
The
district
court recognized that section 2(c)
"prohibits unearned payments to the other party to a
transaction or to an agent who is subject to the control of
a
person
other
than
the one making the payment."
Considering the statute, case precedents and legislative
history, the district court concluded that section 2(c)
"applies only to unlawful payments which pass between
sellers and purchasers."
In this case MRC was not a
purchaser from Congoleum; instead MRC was an agent of
Congoleum. Therefore the payments made from MRC to Berk did
not violate section
The court of appeals agreed with the district court,
noting
concern
"whether
Congress
intended to swee g
3
commercial bribery within the ambit of section 2(c)."?
While the court recognized that at least three circuits
(6th
Cir., 7th Cir., 9th Cir.) held commercial bribery
came within the terms of section 2(c), and that these
decisions have been generally accepted and supported by the
statutory language, the court was not convinced the scope of
2(c) covers the conduct here.
In the appellate decisions which have found commercial
bribery within the ambit of section 2(c) the common
thread has been the passing of illegal payments from
seller to buyer or vice versa.
Adherence to the
requirement that payments cross this seller-buyer line
is consistent with the interpretation of 2(c) in
nonbribery cases . . . . Here, that line has not been
crossed.
a sales agent of the seller Congoleum,
bribed Berk, the seller's employee.
MRC was not a

purchaser, and consequently, the statutory requisites
have not been met.3b
In Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA 37
Gregoris is a Datsun dealership, while Nissan is the
American branch of the Japanese manufacturer of Datsun
vehicles.
Richard Hungerford is Nissan's Regional Sales
Manager.
Gregoris alleges, among other things a violation
of section 2(c) when Hungerford sought and
bribes
from Datsun dealers competing with Gregoris. Any dealer
paying bribes would receive a favorable allocation of cars
receiving early delivery and desirable models:
S1nce Gregoris did not give bribes, its allocations of new
cars was substantially
to the point of threatening
to destroy its
One of the defenses raised by Hungerford and the
bribe-paying dealers was that there can be no violation of
section 2(c) without anticompetitive injury. The district
court held:
While several courts have required anticompetitive
injury for a section 2(c) claim . . . this Court is
persuaded that anticompetitive injury is not necessary
for maintaining a claim under § 2(c) . . . . Such a
requirement
is unduly restrictiye and is not part of
the plain language of the
.

Another defense was that the "plaintiff must have
suffered the injury of price discrimination as a result of
bribery." The district court rejected this defense.
Although the Robinson-Patman Act is directed mainly at
price discrimination, § 2(c) does not specifically
mention price discrimination as the forbidden goal of
the bribery.
Increasingly the case law supports the
conclusion that a violation of § 2(c) can be based on
indirect
price discrimination.
In fact
business
practices other than price discrimination
give rise
to a § 2(c)
It is interesting to note that although the court in
Seaboard expressed doubts whether Congress intended to sweep
commercial
bribery within the ambit of section 2(c),
Gregoris expressly declared that section 2(c) "forbids
commercial bribery in connection with the sale or purchase
of goods or
In Stephen Jay Photography. Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,42
Stephen
Jay
and Olan Mills are competing commercial
in the Norfolk, Virginia, area.
Through
competitive negotiation Olan Mills and one other commercial
photographer contracted with all 22 high schools in the
Norfolk area whereby Olan would be the official photographer
for high school yearbook pictures. It was also agreed that
Olan would pay the schools a percentage of the profits
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earned from sales of optional portrait photographs of
students.
Letters to the students disclosed that Olan was
the official photographer and that part of the optional
portrait photograph price would be given to the school to
support various school activities. Although students were
not
obligated to use the official
this
marketing plan of coordinating the yearbook plctures and
portraits, coupled with the endorsement
the school, gave
Olan a competitive advantage over competlng photographers,
such as Stephen Jay, in selling portraits. Stephen Jay
Olan claiming, among other things, that_Olan engaged ln
commercial bribery in violation of sectlon 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act.43
One of the defenses raised by Olan was that commercial
bribery does not constitute a v iolation of section 2(c) .
The court indicated that this circuit (4th Cir.) had not yet
addressed the issue. Nevertheless four
7th
9th) have applied a commercial brlbery analysls ln
section 2(c) cases.4 4
Also the legislative
section 2(c), as stated in Broch,
that Congress intended to
commerclal brlbery Wlthln
the ambit of section 2(c). ? Therefore the court
without deciding, that section 2(c) proscribes commerclal
bribery.
Another defense raised by Olan was that the schools
were not "agents . .
acting in fact for . . . any party to
such transaction."
The court recognized that commercial
bribery cases must involve the corruption of an agency
relationship.
Any
alleged
bribes
must
cross
the
seller-buyer line.
In this case, according to the court,
there was no agency relationship between the schools and the
students because "the schools did not have authority to bind
the students to purchase portraits. Instead the students
were free to purchase portraits from [Olan] or
a
photographer of their choice, or to purchase no portralts
from anyone."
Therefore,
even
assuming section 2(c) proscribes
commercial bribery, we conclude that no violation
occurred here.
Unquestionably, the schools and
students enjoy a special relationship of trust. And lt
is true that the schools arranged to have yearbook
photographs taken by [Olan] and encouraged students to
purchase
portraits
from
them.
However, letters
encouraging
the
students
to
. these
photographs . . . indicated that thelr declslon
purchase
portraits
was
optional.
From
thls
correspondence it is abundantly clear that the
did not assume a position
that of a portralt
purchasing agent for the students.
Another
relationship

recent case questioning whether an agency
existed is Harris v . Duty Free Shoppers Ltd.

4
Partnership. 7
Harris and Duty Free Shoppers operate
competing duty free stores in downtown San Francisco,
catering especially to Japanese tourists. Duty Free paid
lump sum amounts and commissions to tour companies and to
tour
guides to promote Duty Free's downtown shop by
scheduling stops of tour buses at the store. The tourists
are not required to buy from Duty Free. They can and do
purchase goods from other stores
The tourists do not know
that
is making these payments.
Apparently,
hotels, alrllnes, and other businesses make similar payments
to travel companies.
Harris, who does not make payments
sued. Duty Free claiming, among other things, a violation of
sectlon 2(:) of the Robinson-Patman Act. More specifically
Harris clalmed that the tour guides owe a fiduciary duty to
the tourists, and that duty was breached by accepting
payments from Duty Free.48
The court held that the "tour guides and tour operators
are not in an agency or fiduciary relationship with their
passengers, nor do they serve as intermediaries 'subject to
the direct or indirect control' of those passengers with
regard to the transactions in question - the
of
Duty Free's retail goods." The reasons given by the court
were
there was no employment relationship between the
tour
and the tourists, the tour guides were not
II
tguldes
II
exper s
on whose advice the tourists relied the tour
were not "at all times subject to the
of the
tourlsts, and the tourists were free to purchase their
souvenirs anywhere, or, in fact, not at all. Therefore
there was no violation of section 2(c).49
The court underscored the issue by stating it made no
difference "whether the tour guides' services were available
to
competitors
of
Duty
Free
on
like
terms
or
conditions, . . . whether the value of the tour guides
services
correspond to the payments, and whether the
payments were secret." The crucial issue here was "whether
the tour guides are
of the tourists such that they
owe a fiduciary duty."
Since there was no fiduciary duty
between the tour guides and the tourists, there could be no
violation of section 2(c).
Although these recent lower court interpretations of
section 2(c) are sometimes inconsistent with each other the
following principles can be gleaned:
'
(1)

Section 2(c) is a "per se" violation.

(2)

The "for services rendered" defense in section 2(c) is
very narrowly applied.
It has only been included to
make sure a "bona fide" independent broker will not be
denied compensation for rendering services to his own
principal.
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(3)

Although some courts question whether anticompetitive
injury is a necessary element for a section 2(c)
violation there is strong support in section 2(c), its
history, Broch, and court
that
anticompetitive injury is not a prerequlslte for a
section 2(c) violation.

( 4)

Section 2(c) applies only to unlawful payments (or
other discriminatory business practices) that pass
between
sellers
and
purchasers.
There must be
corruption of an agency relationship.

( 5)

Several federal court decisions indicate that Congress
intended to sweep commercial bribery cases within the
ambit of section 2(c).

(6)

Section
2(c)
discrimination.
discrimination
violation.

( 7)

It is irrelevant in defense of a section 2(c) charge
whether alleged illegal payments are equally available
to all purchasers, whether payments correspond to the
value of services rendered, or whether payments were
secret.

based
on indirect price
can
be
Business practices other than price
can
give rise to a section 2(c)

Having reviewed the provisions of
Act, especially section 2(c); the
declslon,
its discussion of the legislative hlstory of sectlon 2(c),
and recent lower court opinions interpreting section 2(c);
the question still remains to what extent in?entive
by merchant-sellers, in which cash and prlzes are pald to
buyers' agents
should be permitted under section 2(c) of
the
Act. A "case in point" (similar to the
American
Appliance example introducing this paper) is
Metrix v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft. 51
METRIX v. DAIMLER-BENZ AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Metrix Warehouse, Inc.
(Metrix) and Mercedes-Benz of
North
America (MBNA) are competitors in the sale of
automobile parts to approximately 400 Mercedes-Benz dealers
in the United States.
Metrix has an incentive program
whereby it makes payments to parts managers of Mercedes-Benz
dealerships based on the number of Metrix products purchased
by the parts managers' employers.
More specifically the incentive program involves the
awarding of points redeemable for either cash or merchandise
or the payment of cash directly to the parts managers of the
Mercedes-Benz dealers.
These payments are based on a
percentage
of total parts purchased from Metrix.
As
consideration for the payments, the parts managers perform

no services other
orders with Metrix.

than

placing

their employers purchase

During a six-year period, Metrix paid at least $119,980
in cash and $394,551 in cash and/or merchandise to parts
managers of Mercedes-Benz dealers for the placement of
approximately $13,000,000 in spare parts orders with Metrix.
Payments are mailed monthly by Metrix to the parts managers
at
their home address.
The value of the points is
approximately
percent of the purchase price.52
When
Metrix
was
charged
with
a violation of
section 2(c), Metrix argued there could be no violation
since
the
incentive
program
increased, rather than
decreased, competition.
Therefore there was no adverse
effect on competition.
The district court agreed with
Metrix finding "that questions of fact remain whether the
incentive program decreases competition." Stated otherwise,
the district court agreed with Metrix that a finding of an
adverse effect on competit1Qn is necessary for there to be a
violation of section 2(c).?5
The court of appeals reversed, holding that section
2(c)
is
a
"per
se"
violation,
and
that Metrix
violated section 2(c).
Nothing in the language of section 2(c) . . . requires
proof of an adverse effect on competition before a
violation may be found where there is an admitted
payment of a commission or other compensation to an
agent of the purchaser .
Any change in the law
to address the competitive effect of such compensation
must be made by Congress . . . . ?
Using the language of section 2(c), Metrix is "any
person" who "pay(s)
.
. anything of value as . . .
compensation" to "an agent" (parts managers) of the "other
party" (Mercedes-Benz dealers), where such agent (parts
managers) is "subject to the direct control" of any party
(Mercedes-Benz dealers) "other than the person (Metrix) by
whom such compensation is paid.n55
Comparing Metrix to the American Appliance example
introducing this paper, there appears to be no difference
between the two.
Both are "per se" violations of section
2(c).
National is "any person" who "pay(s) . . . anything
of value as . . . compensation" to "an agent" (American's
salespeople) of the "other party" (American), where such
agent (American's salespeople) is "subject to the direct
control" of any party (American) "other than the person
(National) by whom such compensation is paid."
To what extent it wise and feasible to regulate such
incentive plans under section 2(c)?
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Incentive programs by merchant-sellers in which cash
and prizes are paid to buyers' agents should be strictly
prohibited under section 2(c) .
It is well settled that
section 2(c) is a "per se" violation.
The weight of
authority
is
that
anticompetitive
injury is not a
prerequisite for a section 2(c) violation. It is irrelevant
whether
payments correspond to the value of services
rendered or whether the payments were secret. Section 2(c)
covers commercial bribery. As long as there is corruption
of an agency relationship (i.e. the payments pass between
sellers and buyers) the conduct should be subject to
scrutiny under section 2(c).
The purpose of section 2(c) is to cover all means
by
which
brokerage
could
be used to
price
discrimination.
Since there is always the problem of
antitrust
when an individual alleges a section 2(c)
violation,?
the Federal Trade Commission should take
responsibility for vigorous enforcement of section 2(c).
Any dissatisfaction with the anticompetitive effects of 2(c)
should be addressed by Congress and not by the courts.
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BARGAINING WITH STAKEHOLDERS:
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
by
Julianne Nelson*
Corporate codes of conduct or ethics have become increasingly
popular in recent years. Of the 264 companies responding to
a recent Conference Board survey, more than 75% had some form
of ethics code; almost half of the firms with codes in place
had adopted them since 1987. 1 Nor is the adoption of codes
merely a recent phenomenon:
a 1980 study by White and
Montgomery found that almost 100% of the largest US
corporations had codes in place. 2
When, if ever, would a self-interested shareholder support a
corporate code of conduct?
Do such codes ever increase
shareholder wealth? If one relies on instincts honed by the
study of competitive markets, one is likely to assume that
benefits for customers, suppliers, employees and the local
community necessarily come at the expense of corporate
shareholders.
The very structure of the much-publicized
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Credo (reprinted in the Appendix)
appears to support this hypothesis. When detailing corporate
responsibilities,
the Credo mentions the interests of
corporate shareholders last, only after it enumerates the
duties owed to a variety of other stakeholders.
In effect,
the J&J Credo seems to implement a plural purpose view of the
firm that asks managers to serve a number of constituencies.
It remains to be seen whether or not this approach could also
benefit a strictly self-interested shareholder.
Recent results from applied bargaining theory suggest that the
J&J Credo may actually increase shareholder wealth in some
circumstances.
Institutional theorists have recently turned
to "cooperative" solution concepts to determine the efficiency
implications of different corporate ownership structures. In
general, research in this area starts from the assumption that
* Assistant Professor, Economics Area, Stern School of
Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York,
NY 10003. I would like to thank Robert Lindsay for his most
helpful comments on an earlier version of this work.

